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Respondent. 
i Case No. 940713-CA 
i Priority No. 14 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann. S 63-
46b-16 (1993), and Utah Code Ann. $ 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1994). 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
The following statutory provisions are relevant to the 
determination of this case: 
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
• • • . 
(g) the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court? 
(h) the agency action is: 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior 
practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons 
that demonstrate a fair and rational basis 
for the inconsistency. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16(4)(g), -16(4)(h)(iii)(1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Has Ostler waived both his claims (that the 
Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) factual finding is not supported 
by substantial evidence and that his license revocation is 
unjustifiably inconsistent with past disciplinary actions by the 
Commission) by failing to raise them during agency review by the 
Department of Commerce? 
Standard of Review; Waiver is an issue decided in the first 
instance by the appellate court. Under the waiver doctrine, a 
party petitioning for judicial review of an agency decision is 
precluded from claiming Msubstantial prejudice" based on an issue 
not presented to the agency. Gibson v. Board of Review, 707 P.2d 
675 (Utah 1985); see Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587 
(Utah App. 1990). 
2. Should the Court accept, as supported by substantial 
evidence, the ALJ's finding that Ostler induced a buyer to 
request reimbursement of earnest money through dishonesty in 
light of Ostler's failure to marshall any record evidence that 
contradicts this finding? 
Standard of Review: One who challenges an agency's factual 
findings under Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1993) must 
marshall all the evidence supporting those findings and then show 
that, despite that evidence and the reasonable inferences 
therefrom, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence 
on the whole record. Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 
P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah 1993); First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of 
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Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990); Tasters Ltd, Inc. 
v. Department Enrol. Sec., 863 P.2d 12, 18 (Utah App. 1993), cert, 
denied, P. 2d (Utah 1994). If the marshalling burden is not metf 
the reviewing court accepts the challenged findings. E.g., 
Johnson v. Board of Review, 842 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah App. 1992). 
3. Even if the issue were properly before this Court, is 
there substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that 
Ostler induced a buyer to request reimbursement of earnest money 
through dishonesty? 
Standard of Review: Substantial evidence is "that quantum 
and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a 
reasonable mind to support a conclusion.- First Nat'l Bank, 799 
P.2d at 1165; accord Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 
137 (Utah App. 1992). A reviewing court does not redetermine 
credibility or reweigh the record evidence, Ouestar Pipeline Co. 
v. State Tax Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993). 
4. Even if the claim regarding the sanction of license 
revocation has not been waived, has Ostler failed to make out a 
prima facie case of inconsistent agency action as required by 
Pickett? 
Standard of Review: Whether a petitioner has made out a 
prima facie case of inconsistent agency action under Pickett v. 
Dep't of Commerce, 858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah App. 1993) and Utah 
Code Ann. S 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) (1993) is a question of law 
decided in the first instance by the appellate court. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 28, 1989/ T. Morris Ostler negotiated an earnest 
money sales agreement in which Gidalthi 0. Ojeda and his wife 
offered to purchase a home in Provo, Utah from Robert and Alice 
Skankey. At that time he was affiliated as an associate broker 
with Help-U-Sell of Utah County. The Ojedas made a $500.00 
earnest money deposit which was deposited in Ostler's principal 
broker Shane Luck's trust account. While the sale was pending, 
it was discovered that the loan the Ojedas had agreed to assume 
was non-assumable. Mr. Luck instructed Ostler not to close the 
transaction because the loan could be called due on the sale of 
the property and because title insurance could not be issued on a 
property encumbered by this type of loan. Mr. Luck would not 
close the transaction through Help-U-Sell. On January 18, 1990, 
Mr. Luck terminated Ostler's affiliation with Help-U-Sell and his 
associate broker license was inactivated.1 (Findings, Addendum 
B; Record [hereafter "R."] 118-19). 
Notwithstanding the inactive status of his license# Ostler 
continued to work with the Ojedas and the Skankeys. In spite of 
Mr. Luck's admonition, Ostler conducted the closing of the sale 
on January 22, 1990.2 Ostler received $1,950.00 at the closing 
1
 Effective February 10, 1990, Ostler's license was 
suspended for a one-year period pursuant to an order of the 
Commission. The suspension was prompted by Ostler's conviction 
on charges of possession of a forged document in connection with 
a real estate transaction. (Findings, Addendum B; R. 118). 
2
 The parties stipulated that the sale closed in February 
while Ostler's license was suspended. (Stipulation, R. 100-1). 
The ALJ, however, found that "the more substantial evidence 
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which he deposited in his personal checking account. In 
additionf he received funds payable to the Skankeys which he also 
deposited into his personal account. (Findings, Addendum B; R. 
119). 
Ostler told the Ojedas that they could recover the $500.00 
earnest money on deposit with Help-U-Sell by telling Mr. Luck 
that the sale had failed. Sometime prior to February 16, 1990/ 
Mr. Ojeda contacted Mr. Luck requesting the return of his 
$500.00f claiming that the sale had failed. Mr. Luck made 
further inquiries of Ojeda and discovered that the transaction 
had in fact closed. Following Mr. Luck's discovery that the sale 
had closed. Ostler attempted to give Help-U-Sell the funds it 
would have been due had the sale been closed under its aegis. 
Mr. Luck refused the money and paid the $500.00 earnest money to 
the Skankeys to whom it should have been credited. (Findings/ 
Addendum B; R. 119-20). 
After a hearing, in an order dated July 6f 1994/ the 
Commission revoked Ostler's license. (Addendum C; R. 123). 
The Commission's order was based on explicit statutory authority: 
The commission/ with the concurrence of the director . 
. . may suspend/ revoke . . . or deny renewal . . . of 
any license . . . if at any time the licensee . . . is 
found guilty of: 
(6) Failing/ within a reasonable time/ to account for 
or to remit any monies coming into his possession which 
belong to others, or commingling those funds with his 
ownf or diverting those funds from the purpose for 
which they were received; 
establishes the closing occurred January 22, 1990.M (Findings, 
Addendum B; R. 119). 
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(15) Violating or disregarding this chapter, an order 
of the commission, or the rules adopted by the 
commission and the division; 
(17) Any other conduct which constitutes dishonest 
dealing. 
Utah Code Ann. SS 61-2-11(6), (15), and (17) (1989 & Supp. 1990). 
The ALJ concluded that Ostler violated all three sections of the 
Utah Code quoted above. (Conclusions, Addendum B; R. 120). The 
ALJ noted that Ostler acknowledged that he received funds owed to 
the sellers and deposited those funds in his personal account, 
thus commingling them, and failed to remit those funds in timely 
fashion, all in violation of section 61-2-11(6). 
The ALJ further noted that Ostler acknowledged that he 
received a commission when he was not affiliated with a principal 
broker and his license was inactive. He paid himself a 
commission although he was not licensed as a principal broker. 
Ostler also violated an order previously entered by the 
Commission when he disbursed funds from the closing while his 
license was suspended. The ALJ concluded that Ostler "engaged in 
multiple instances of misconduct violative of Section 61-2-
11(15)." Finally, the ALJ found Ostler had "disingenuously and 
implicitly encouraged Mr. Ojeda to improperly seek the release of 
the earnest monies held by the brokerage." The ALJ concluded 
that Ostler "clearly engaged in dishonest dealings violative of 
Section 61-2-11(17)." (Conclusions, Addendum B; R. 120). 
The Commission's order was affirmed on agency review by the 
Executive Director of the Department of Commerce, Constance B. 
White. Ms. White considered whether the Commission, in revoking 
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Ostler's license, had properly interpreted and applied the 
relevant statutory and regulatory provisions relating to Ostler's 
conduct. Ms. White found that the Commission properly considered 
all facts in mitigation weighing in Ostler's favor and all 
aggravating facts weighing against him. She concluded that the 
revocation order was based upon fact and entered according to 
law, and she upheld it in its entirety. (Addendum A; R. 150-
154). 
On December 5, 1994, Ostler filed a petition to stay the 
order revoking his license. (R. 155-57). The Division denied 
Ostler's petition on January 12, 1995, on the grounds that he 
poses a substantial threat to the public safety and welfare. (R. 
165-66). 
Ostler now requests this Court to set aside the order of the 
Department of Commerce affirming the Commission's order revoking 
Ostler's license. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Ostler argues that: (1) the ALJ's finding that he induced a 
buyer of real property to seek reimbursement of his earnest money 
deposit by dishonest means is not supported by substantial 
evidence; and (2) the Commission's order revoking his license is 
inconsistent with prior agency actions under the Pickett 
standard. Ostler waived both of these claims because he did not 
raise them on agency review by the Department of Commerce.3 
3
 In addition to waiving his claims by not raising them on 
agency review, Ostler did not comply with the requirements of 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. He has not 
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Even if Ostler had not waived his substantial evidence 
claim, he has not met his burden of marshalling all of the 
supporting evidence and then the contrary evidence. Even if the 
issue were properly before this Court, there is substantial 
evidence to support the ALJ's finding. The finding is solidly 
based on the testimony of Ostler's former principal broker as 
well as the testimony of Ostler himself. Furthermore, even if 
Ostler had not waived his inconsistent sanction claim, he has not 
established a prima facie case that the Commission's order was 
inconsistent with prior agency action as required by Pickett. 
Thus, Ostler's arguments fail on their merits. For the reasons 
set forth below, this Court should uphold the Department's order 
affirming the Commission's license revocation order. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
OSTLER WAIVED BOTH HIS CLAIMS BY FAILING TO RAISE THEM 
DURING AGENCY REVIEW BY THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. 
The ALJ found that Ostler induced the buyer in the subject 
real estate transaction, Gidalthi 0. Ojeda, to seek reimbursement 
of his earnest money deposit by falsely representing that the 
transaction had failed when, in fact, it had closed. Ostler 
argues that this finding is not supported by substantial 
supported his statement of facts with citations to the record. 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7). He has not cited the record to show 
that the issues he raises were preserved, nor does his brief 
contain a statement setting forth the grounds for seeking review 
when the issues were not preserved. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5). 
Thus, this Court could disregard or strike his brief. Utah R. 
App. P. 24(j). 
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evidence. Ostler further argues that the Commission's order 
revoking his license is contrary to the Division's prior practice 
under the standard set forth by this Court in Pickett, 858 P.2d 
at 191. 
Waiver is an issue decided in the first instance by the 
appellate court. Under the waiver doctrine, a party petitioning 
for judicial review of an agency decision is precluded from 
claiming "substantial prejudice" based on an issue not presented 
to the agency. Gibson v. Board of Review, 707 P.2d 675 (Utah 
1985). In Gibson, this Court stated: "Issues not raised before 
the administrative agency are waived on appeal." Id. at 677. See 
also Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587 (Utah App. 1990). 
Ostler did not raise either of his claims during agency 
review by the Department of Commerce. (Petition requesting 
agency review and supporting memorandum, Addendum D; R. 136-43). 
Thus, he cannot raise them now on appeal: "It is axiomatic in 
our adversary system that a party must raise an objection in an 
earlier proceeding or waive its right to litigate the issue in 
subsequent proceedings." Brinkerhoff, 790 P.2d at 589. 
This Court should, therefore, decline to reach both of the 
issues raised by Ostler on appeal. 
II 
EVEN IF THE FACTUAL CHALLENGE WERE NOT WAIVED, THERE IS 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT OSTLER INDUCED A BUYER TO 
REQUEST REIMBURSEMENT OF EARNEST MONEY THROUGH 
DISHONESTY. 
Ostler argues that the ALJ's finding that Ostler induced the 
buyer to obtain a refund of his earnest money by dishonest means 
9 
is not supported by substantial evidence. An agency's factual 
findings cannot be upset by a reviewing court if they are 
supported by substantial evidence based upon the record as a 
whole. Zissi v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 842 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 
1992). -Substantial evidence*1 is that quantum and quality of 
relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind 
to support a conclusion. First Nat'l Bank, 799 P.2d at 1165; 
accord Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 
1992). A reviewing court does not redetermine credibility or 
reweigh the record evidence, Questar Pipeline Co. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993). 
The ALJ found that: 
Respondent told Mr. Ojeda that he (the latter) 
could inform Mr. Luck the transaction had failed to 
obtain the $500 earnest money still held in the Help-U-
Sell trust account. 
Prior to February 16, 1990, Mr. Ojeda contacted 
Mr. Luck and informed the latter that the transaction 
had failed. Mr. Ojeda thus requested the return of the 
earnest money deposit. Mr. Luck made further inquiry 
and Mr. Ojeda then admitted the transaction had closed. 
(Findings, Addendum B; R. 118). The ALJ's finding is 
supported by the testimony of Shane Luck, Ostler's principal 
broker: 
Q: Do you recall if he told you that—that 
Morris instructed you that—that Morris 
instructed him to tell you that the deal 
had not closed? 
A: That's right, he did say that. 
(R. 236-237). Mr. Luck's testimony is corroborated by Ostler 
himself: 
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Q. You told Mr. Ojeda he had the option to tell Mr. 
Luck the deal had not closed? 
A. That's correct. 
(R. 211). The ALJ's finding is further supported by the 
deposition testimony of Alice Skankey: 
A: He, Morris, asked me to—that I should tell 
Help-U-Sell that the deal had fallen through, 
and I told him that I couldn't do that because 
that would be lying and the deal was going 
through with the Ojedas. 
(R. 216). 
The testimony of Mr. Luck and Ostler, taken together with 
the testimony of Alice Skankey, provide "that quantum and quality 
of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable 
mind to support a conclusion." First Nat'l Bank, 799 P.2d at 
1165. The testimony that Ostler quotes at length in his brief 
(Br. of Petitioner at 11-15) supports the ALJ's finding that 
Ostler urged Mr. Ojeda to tell Mr. Luck that the transaction had 
failed, when in fact it had closed, so that Mr. Ojeda could 
obtain his earnest money deposit. 
In addition, Ostler argues that the challenged finding is 
not supported by substantial evidence because it is based, in 
part, on the testimony of Mr. Luck which Ostler maintains is 
inadmissible hearsay. Mr. Luck testified as to his conversation 
with Mr. Ojeda in which Mr. Ojeda requested a return of his 
earnest money. (R. 68-70). Even if Mr. Luck's testimony is 
hearsay, hearsay evidence is admissible in administrative 
hearings. UAPA provides: "The presiding officer may not exclude 
evidence solely because it is hearsay." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
11 
8(1)(c) (1993). And the Utah Supreme Court has long recognized: 
"[T]here are significant differences between court trials and 
proceedings before administrative agencies. . . . Hearsay 
evidence is admissible in proceedings before administrative 
agencies.- Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 681 P.2d 
1224, 1226 (Utah 1984); accord Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d 
449, 450 (Utah App. 1993). In support of his contention that Mr. 
Shane's testimony is inadmissible hearsay, Ostler cites State v. 
Sibert, 310 P.2d 388 (Utah 1957), and State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1986). Both of these cases involve criminal matters and 
are, therefore, inapposite. 
Hearsay is admissible in administrative hearings, but not 
without limitation. "[F]indings of fact cannot be based 
exclusively on hearsay evidence. They must be supported by a 
residuum of legal evidence in a court of law." Yacht Club, 681 
P.2d at 1226; accord Maves v. Department of Employment Security, 
754 P.2d 989, 992 (Utah App. 1988). The ALJ's finding that 
Ostler had induced Ojeda to request reimbursement of the earnest 
money through dishonesty was not based solely upon the testimony 
of Mr. Luck. Ostler's own testimony corroborates Mr. Luck's 
testimony. Ostler admitted at the hearing that he told Mr. Ojeda 
that he could try to collect the $500.00 earnest money from Help-
U-Sell by telling Mr. Luck that the transaction had not closed. 
(R. 211). As noted above, Mr. Luck's testimony is further 
corroborated by the deposition testimony of Alice Skankey. (R. 
12 
216). Thus, the ALJ's finding is supported by substantial 
evidence that satisfies the residuum rule. 
Ill 
EVEN IF THE CLAIM REGARDING THE SANCTION OF LICENSE 
REVOCATION WERE NOT WAIVED, OSTLER HAS FAILED TO MAKE 
OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF INCONSISTENT AGENCY ACTION AS 
REQUIRED BY PICKETT, 
Ostler further argues that the Commission's order revoking 
his license is contrary to the Division's prior practice. 
Whether a petitioner has made out a prima facie case of 
inconsistent agency action under Pickett and Utah Code Ann. S 63-
46b-16(4)(h)(iii) (1993) is a question of law decided in the 
first instance by the appellate court. 
In Pickett, 858 P.2d at 191, this Court interpreted section 
63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) of UAPA. That section provides that the 
appellate court shall grant relief only if it determines that the 
person seeking review has been substantially prejudiced by an 
agency action which is "contrary to the agency's prior practice, 
unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and 
reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency." The Court determined that "this section requires 
a petitioner to establish a prima facie case that the 
administrative agency's action in his or her case was 'contrary 
to the agency's prior practice."1 Id. (quoting the statute). 
Once the petitioner meets this burden, the burden of 
persuasion shifts to the agency to demonstrate that the agency's 
departure from prior practice had a fair and rational basis. Id. 
The Court stated that it would review the agency's explanation 
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"on the basis of 'reasonableness and rationality.'" Id. (quoting 
SEMECO v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 849 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 
1993)(Durham, J., dissenting)).4 Review of the penalty itself 
is "limited to determining if the agency has abused the 
discretion granted it to impose sanctions." Id. 
Citing Pickett, Ostler argues that the Commission's order 
revoking his license is contrary to prior agency practice, and 
the Commission has not justified the inconsistency. (Br. of 
Petitioner at 17-19). Applying this Court's analysis in Pickett, 
Ostler has not even taken the first step in supporting his 
argument: Ostler has not established a prima facie case that the 
Commission's order was inconsistent with prior agency decisions. 
While Ostler claims that the Commission's order in this case is 
inconsistent with prior agency decisions, he cites no other 
agency decisions in support of his contention. Thus, Ostler has 
not established a prima facie case that the Commission departed 
from its previous practice in revoking his license.5 
* The Court noted that *[t]he majority opinion in SEMECO 
had no occasion to discuss the issue addressed by the portion of 
Justice Durham's dissenting opinion which we adopt and did not 
otherwise criticize or remark on her discussion of burdens of 
proof." Pickett, 858 P.2d at 191 n.9. 
5
 The instant case is the second action the Division has 
brought against Ostler's license. (Order on Review, Addendum A; 
R. 150, 152). In February 1990, the Commission issued an order 
suspending Ostler's license for a one-year period in connection 
with a criminal conviction involving forgery of a quitclaim deed 
and boundary line agreement. (Case No. RE89-06-10, R. 171; 
Findings, Addendum B; R 119). The Commission's order revoking 
Ostler's license for a second violation of Utah real estate law, 
committed during a time when his license was suspended for the 
first violation, is consistent with prior agency practice. The 
Commission has consistently imposed harsher penalties in 
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CONCLUSION 
Ostler waived both of his claims (that the ALJ's factual 
finding is not supported by substantial evidence and that his 
license revocation is unjustifiably inconsistent with past 
disciplinary actions by the Commission) by failing to raise them 
during agency review by the Department of Commerce. Even if 
Ostler had preserved his challenge to the ALJ's factual finding, 
there is substantial competent evidence in the record that Ostler 
encouraged a buyer to seek the return of his earnest money by 
dishonest means. But even if the challenged finding were not 
supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ also based his 
recommended order on other findings of statutory violations. 
Finally, with respect to his claim that the sanction of 
revocation is inconsistent with prior agency decisions, Ostler 
has failed to make out a prima facie case of inconsistent agency 
action as required by Pickett. Thus, this Court should affirm 
connection with second and third violations, frequently revoking 
a license or imposing a long suspension. In In re Makin, RE91-
09-03 (May 15, 1995), the Commission revoked the license of an 
agent in a second violation. (This matter is currently pending 
on agency review.) In In re Turner, RE92-08-01 (May 13, 1994), 
an agent consented to the revocation of his license in settlement 
of the Division's second action against him. In In re Godfrev, 
RE93-01-14 (September 7, 1993), an agent consented to a five-year 
suspension of his license in settlement of a second action 
against him. In In re Parsons, RE92-08-12 (February 23, 1993), 
an agent consented to revocation of her license in settlement of 
a second action. In In re Parks, RE88-06-08 (October 18, 1990), 
a principal broker consented to revocation of her license in 
settlement of a second action brought by the Division against 
her. In In re Rogers, RE87-08-02 (December 15, 1988), the 
Commission revoked the license of a principal broker after a 
hearing on the second action against her. This Court affirmed 
the Department's order on appeal. Rogers v. Division of Real 
Estate, 790 P.2d 102 (Utah App. 1990). 
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the Department's order upholding the revocation of Ostler's 
l i cense . /} 





Assistant Attorney General 
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF 
T. MORRIS OSTLER TO ACT AS A 
REAL ESTATE BROKER 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
CaseNo.RE90-10.01 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter comes before the Executive Director on the request for agency review filed by 
T. Morris Ostler ("Petitioner") following the revocation of his license to act as a real estate broker 
by the Real Estate Division ("Division"). The Division entered an order revoking Petitioner's 
license on July 6, 1994, to become effective August 8, 1994. Petitioner originally requested 
reconsideration from the Division following entry of the revocation order, and the Attorney 
General's office moved for dismissal of that request. The Division forwarded Petitioner's request 
for reconsideration to the executive director for treatment as a request for agency review. 
Petitioner subsequently filed a timely request for agency review with the Department and 
requested oral argument. This matter is properly before me as a request for agency review; the 
request for oral argument is denied however, because the issues appear to be adequately 
developed in the pleadings filed herein. 
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW 
Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted pursuant to Section 63-46b-12, 
Utah Code Annotated, and Rule R151-46b-13 of the Utah Administrative Code. 
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ISSUES REVIEWED 
Whether the Division, in revoking Petitioner's license, has properly interpreted and applied 
the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions relating to Petitioner's conduct. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Division commenced this proceeding by filing a notice of agency action on 
July 23, 1991. A hearing was conducted in this matter on April 18, 1994. On July 6, 1994, the 
Division adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the Real Estate 
Commission ("Commission") following the April hearing and thereby revoked Petitioner real 
estate broker's license. Those Findings and Conclusions are adopted for purposes of this review. 
In addition, Petitioner entered into a stipulation with the Division, by which he expressly admitted 
as true certain allegations made by the Division. 
2. In his request for agency review Petitioner contends that the sanction imposed is 
too severe under the circumstances. He cites, as mitigating against the sanction imposed, the fact 
that Petitioner readily admitted to the Division his error in closing the transaction that gave rise to 
the administrative action at a time when his license was inactive, that Petitioner's motivation 
regarding the transaction was the protection of the parties to the transaction, and that no 
complaints have been received by the Division regarding Petitioner since the petition was filed in 
1991. 
In place of the Division's order of revocation, Petitioner requests a three month suspension 
and a fine up to $1000, or as an alternative, suspension of the Division's order of revocation for 
some probationary period determined by the Commission. 
3. In response, the Division reasserts its position that the severity of the Petitioner's 
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misconduct mandates the revocation. It also states that at least one complaint against Petitioner 
has been received by the Division since the hearing. I note also that this is the second action 
against Petitioner's license . During 1990 and 1991, Petitioner's license had been suspended in 
CaseNo.RE89-06-10. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Under Department Rule Rl5 l-46b-13(3) the Division's order is stayed pending 
completion agency review. 
2. The conclusions of law adopted by the Division following the April hearing 
accurately apply the law to the facts in this case. Utah Code Subsection 61-2-11(6) states that the 
Division may revoke the license of a licensee if the licensee is found guilty of: 
(6) failing, within a reasonable time, to account for or to remit any monies coming into his 
possession that belong to others, or commingling those funds with his own, or diverting 
those funds from the purpose for which they were received; 
Petitioner admitted violating this provision by commingling funds he received after closing 
the Skanky-Ojeda transaction. In addition Petitioner admitted violating Utah Code Section 61-2-
1 (prohibiting unlicensed activity) in closing the Skanky-Ojeda transaction and accepting a sales 
commission while his license was inactive. 
The Commission made a finding regarding the most egregious conduct leading to 
Petitioner's license revocation, the dishonest dealing resulting from his inducement of Mr. Ojeda 
to request reimbursement of earnest money through dishonesty, in violation of Utah Code 
Subsection 61-2-11(17). While Petitioner urges certain facts in mitigation of his conduct, none of 
them outweigh the gravity of this fact. I find that the Commission properly considered all facts 
mitigating in Petitioner's favor and all aggravating facts weighing against him. Consequently, the 
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revocation order was based on fact and entered according to law. The Division's order is 
therefore upheld in its entirety. 
ORDER 
Consistent with the preceding analysis, the Division's revocation of Petitioner's license is 
upheld in its entirety. Consistent with Department Rule Rl 51-46b-13 (5), the revocation of 
Petitioner's license is effective November 28, 1994. 
Dated this W day of October 1994.. 
Constance B. White, Executive Director 
Department of Commerce 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the 
Court of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance of this Order on Review. Any Petition for 
Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-16 Utah Code 
Annotated. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the £ p day of October 1994,1 caused to be mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Order on Review, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to: 
Thomas W. Seiler 
Attorney for Petitioner 
80 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 
Provo, Utah 84603-1266 
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to: 
Steven Stewart, Director 
Division of Real Estate 
160 East 300 South 




BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the License : FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
of T. Morris Ostler to Act as a : AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
Real Estate Broker : RE90-10-01 
Appearances: 
Thomas W. Seller for Respondent 
Paul M. Grant for the Division of Real Estate 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
An April 18, 1994 hearing was conducted in the above-entitled proceeding before J. Steven 
Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department of the Commerce. The parties initially 
submitted a stipulation of undisputed facts. Therefore, evidence was offered and received. 
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now submits the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order for review and action by the Real 
Estate Commission and the Director of the Division of Real Estate: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent is presently licensed to practice as a real estate broker in Utah, He was 
initially licensed as a sales agent in 1975. Respondent became a licensed broker in October 1987 
and he was affiliated with Help-U-Sell of Utah County from at least November 1989 to January 18, 
1990. During that time, Respondent's principal broker was Shane Luck. 
2. On November 28, 1989, Respondent prepared an earnest money sales agreement, whereby 
Gidalthi O. Ojeda D offered to purchase a Provo, Utah home owned by a Robert and Alice Skankey. 
Respondent received $500 earnest money, which he deposited to the Help-U-Sell real estate trust 
account The Skankeys accepted the offer Help-U-Sell was to be paid a fee totalling $2,450 on the 
sale of the home. Respondent's commission, payable from that amount, would total $1,110. 
3. Respondent's affiliation with Help-U-Sell was terminated January 18, 1990. The Ojeda-
Skankey transaction had not closed as of that date. Prior to terminating Respondent's affiliation with 
the Help-U-Sell brokerage, Mr. Luck inquired if Respondent had any transactions which were still 
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pending. Respondent stated no outstanding transactions existed. The Ojeda-Skankey transaction was 
scheduled to close on or about January 20, 1990. 
4. Respondent's license was inactivated January 18, 1990 and remained in that status for 
approximately three (3) weeks. The license was then suspended for one (1) year, effective February 
10, 1990, pursuant to an order entered by the Commission (Case No. RE89-06-10). The suspension 
was prompted by Respondent's conviction for the possession of a forged document, relative to a real 
estate transaction. 
5. On January 20, 1990, the Skankeys executed a warranty deed, whereby they conveyed the 
property to the Ojedas. On January 22, 1990, an all-inclusive trust deed was executed by the Ojedas 
and notarized by Respondent. The parties have stipulated the closing on the transaction occurred 
during February 1990. However, both the buyers and sellers statements reflect the taxes and 
mortgage interest payments were prorated as of January 22, 1990. Notwithstanding the parties' 
stipulation, the more substantial evidence establishes the closing occurred January 22, 1990. When 
Respondent closed the transaction, he knew his license was inactive and that the license would be 
suspended in the immediate future. 
6. Mr. Luck had informed Respondent not to close the transaction because the Skankeys had 
a non-assuraable loan on the property and title insurance could not thus be obtained. Mr. Luck 
further declined to close the transaction through Help-U-Sell due to the existence of that loan, which 
included a due-on-sale clause, and Mr. Luck's belief the Ojedas did not understand the possibility the 
loan could be called due on the sale of the property. Moreover, Mr. Luck did not desire to expose 
Help-U-Sell to any liability under those circumstances. 
1. Mr. Luck was not aware Respondent had closed the transaction on January 22, 1990. 
Respondent received $1,950 at closing as the balance of the selling fee and he deposited those funds 
in his own checking account Respondent also received funds payable to the Skankeys and deposited 
those monies in his checking account Respondent told Mr. Ojeda that he (the latter) could inform 
Mr. Luck the transaction had failed to obtain the $500 earnest money still held in the Help-U-Sell 
trust account 
8. Prior to February 16, 1990, Mr. Ojeda contacted Mr. Luck and informed the latter that 
the transaction had failed. Mr. Ojeda thus requested the return of the earnest money deposit Mr, 
Luck made further inquiry and Mr. Ojeda then admitted the transaction had closed. Mr. Luck 
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requested all closing documents be delivered to Help-U-Sell. 
9. On or about February 16, 1990, Respondent tendered an $840 check to Help-U-Sell. The 
February 16, 1990 check represented the selling fee which would have been payable to the brokerage 
less the earnest money still on deposit By letter, dated February 22, 1990, Mr. Luck returned the 
closing documents to Respondent, advised Respondent that the Skankeys had been informed 
Respondent would have the closing documents and informed Respondent that the Skankeys wanted 
"their closing documents and money immediately" and a "settlement on the January rent prorations 
with Ojeda". 
10. Mr. Luck also informed Respondent that he assumed Respondent would provide "the 
appropriate documents concerning this transaction to the Ojedas". Mr. Luck further stated Help-U-
Sell would notify Respondent of "a fee due to us from you for the loss of business to us as a result 
of your actions". Based on the advice of legal counsel that the closing should remain Respondent's 
responsibility, Help-U-Sell did not accept the February 16, 1990 check. Respondent disbursed the 
funds due to the Skankeys on February 16, 1990 and Mr. Luck subsequently sent the earnest money 
deposit to the Skankeys. The Ojedas eventually defaulted on their purchase of the property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Utah Code Ann. Section 61-2-11 provides a civil penalty not to exceed $500 may be imposed 
and a real estate license may be placed on probationary status, suspended or revoked if the licensee, 
whether acting as an agent or on his own account, is found guilty of: 
(6) failing, within a reasonable time, to account for or to remit any 
monies coming into his possession that belong to others, or 
commingling those funds with his own, or diverting those funds from 
the purpose for which they were received. 
(15) violating or disregarding this chapter, an order of the commission or 
the rules adopted by the commission and the division; 
(17) any other conduct which constitutes dishonest dealing. 
Section 61-2-1 provides it is unlawful for any person to act as a principal broker without a 
license. Section 61-2-2 further provides a principal broker's license is required to receive valuable 
consideration for negotiating or closing a sale of real estate. Moreover, Section 61-2-10 provides it 
is unlawful for any associate broker to accept a commission from any person except the principal 
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broker with whom he is affiliated and that an inactive licensee is not authorized to conduct real 
estate transactions. 
Respondent acknowledges he received funds owed to the Skankeys on the closing of the 
transaction, he deposited those funds into his personal account and thus commingled those funds with 
his own monies. Respondent closed the transaction January 22, 1990, but he failed to remit monies 
due to the Skankeys within a reasonable time after the closing of the transaction. Respondent thus 
violated Section 61-2-11(6) in both instances. 
Respondent also acknowledges he received a commission from the sale of the property when 
he was not affiliated with a principal broker and his license was inactive. Respondent paid himself a 
sales commission and fees for closing the transaction, although he was not licensed as a principal 
broker and was thus not entitled to receive consideration directly from the parties. Further, 
Respondent violated the order previously entered by the Commission when he disbursed funds from 
the closing of the transaction while his license was suspended by reason of that order. Respondent 
thus engaged in multiple instances of misconduct violative of Section 61-2-11(15). 
Respondent also suggested Mr. Ojeda erroneously inform Mr. Luck the transaction had closed 
as the means whereby Mr. Ojeda might obtain the earnest money held on deposit through the Help-
U-Sell brokerage. Respondent thus disingenuously and implicitly encouraged Mr. Ojeda to 
improperly seek the release of the earnest monies held by the brokerage. Given the foregoing, 
Respondent clearly engaged in dishonest dealing violative of Section 61-2-11(17). A proper factual 
and legal basis clearly exists to enter a disciplinary sanction as to Respondent's license. 
Respondent urges certain mitigating factors should be considered with regard to any 
disciplinary action taken on his license. Specifically, Respondent contends the Ojedas and the 
Skankeys were highly motivated to close the transaction because the Ojedas would have no place to 
live and the Skankeys would incur a negative cash flow if the transacation did not close. Respondent 
also asserts neither party suffered any damage because the transaction was closed, the brokerage 
unreasonably refused to close the transaction and Respondent merely desired to assist the Ojedas and 
the Skankeys as to promote their interests. 
The parties to this transaction obviously desired a sale be completed. It is unclear from this 
record whether either party suffered any damage by reason of Respondent's unilateral decision to 
close the transaction without the knowledge of and participation by his brokerage. There is no 
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sufficient evidence to find and conclude either the Ojedas or the Skankeys did not understand the 
significance of the non-assumable loan or the existence of the due-on-sale clause. Respondent may 
have been somewhat motivated by his desire to assist both the Ojedas and the Skankeys in their 
desire to complete this transaction. 
However, various aggravating factors exist as to Respondent's misconduct The Court finds 
and concludes Respondent expended substantial efforts to realize the sale of the property, prompt the 
closing of this transaction and that he thus anticipated receiving compensation for those efforts. 
Significantly, Respondent ignored the consequences of his licensure status as he proceeded to close 
the transaction when his license was inactive and later disbursed funds from the transaction while his 
license was suspended. The Court is further disturbed by Respondent's characterization of the 
suspension of his license as a mere "technicality" which would preclude his ability to close the 
transaction. Simply put, Respondent cavalierly continued to act as a broker without any regard for 
the fact his license was inactivated and later suspended. 
The Court duly acknowledges the Division has received no complaints of any misconduct 
undertaken by Respondent during the three years since his license was reinstated. Nevertheless, 
Respondent willingly disregarded those statutes which govern his licensure, particularly when 
partially influenced by the prospect of financial gain. The Court further finds and concludes 
Respondent lacks any genuine acknowledgement of-or significant remorse for-his misconduct. To 
the contrary, Respondent has basically questioned the reluctance of the brokerage to close the 
transaction, minimized his role in Mr. Ojeda's attempt to improperly obtain the earnest money 
deposit and characterized his actions as well-intentioned efforts designed to merely promote the 
interests of the Ojedas and the Skankeys. The serious nature of Respondent's misconduct, coupled 
with his misguided and questionable attitude, compels the conclusion a severe sanction should be 
entered as to his license. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED Respondent's license as a real estate broker be revoked. 
Dated this of July, 1994. 




BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the License 
of T. Morris Ostler to Practice as a 
Real Estate Broker 
ORDER 
RE90-10-01 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order is 
hereby confirmed and adopted. The real estate broker license of T. Morris Ostler is hereby 
revoked, effective August 8, 1994. 
Dated this (MI^ day of July, 1994. 
UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION: 
Claudia E. Ashby (Vice Chair) / 
%U_ 
The above Order is confirmed and adopted by the undersigned this *» day of 
July, 1994. 
Steven H. StewafffDlrector 
Division of Real Estate 
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ADDENDUM D 
THOMAS W. SEILER 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER 
Attorney for T. Morris Ostler 
80 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
In the Matter of the License ) PETITION REQUESTING 
of T. MORRIS OSTLER to act AGENCY REVIEW 
as a Real Estate Broker ) 
) Case No. RE90-10-01 
COMES NOW PETITIONER, T. Morris Ostler, pursuant to 
U.C.A. §61-1-12 (1953 as amended) and the Utah 
Administrative Code §R151-46b-13, by and through his counsel 
of record Thomas W. Seiler of ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER and 
requests Agency Review of the Order dated July 6, 1994 which 
revoked his license to act as a Real Estate Broker in the 
State of Utah. This petition is accompanied by a brief in 
support of grounds for review. Petitioner, further requests 
oral argument be heard as to the merits of the review. 
DATED this / day of August, 1994/rj, 
T. MORRIS OSTLER 
^ o , sEILER . T ^ 
t^^^U:* *«*UJ. »< 
THOMAS W. SEILER 
B300Q136 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned does hereby certify that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR AGENCY REVIEW was 
mailed, with postage prepaid thereon, on the j *SK day of 
August, 1994, to the following: 
Shelly K. Wismer 
Department of Commerce 
Heber M. Wells Building 
163 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Utah Real Estate Commission 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Paul Grant 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capital 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Sander J. Mooy 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capital 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Constance White 
Executive Director of the 
Utah Department of Commerce 
Heber M. Wells Building 
163 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
nJhk Cn A A ft x *J 
g:rivers\litigati\9513A.pet 
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THOMAS W. SEILER (#2910) 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER 
Attorney for T. Morris Ostler 
80 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
In the Matter of the License ) BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
Of T. MORRIS OSTLER to act ) PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR 
as a Real Estate Broker ) AGENCY REVIEW 
) 
) Case No. RE90-10-01 
Pursuant to the Utah Administrative Code R151-46b-
13, Petitioner T. Morris Ostler hereby submits his Brief in 
Support of Petioners Request for Agency Review of the above-
entitled matter. 
FACTS 
1. Petitioner is presently licensed to practice 
as a real estate broker in Utah. He was initially licensed 
as a sales agent in 1975. Petitioner became a licensed broker 
in October 1987 and he was affiliated with Help-U-Sell of Utah 
County from at least November 1989 to January 18, 1990. 
During that time, Petitioner's principal broker was Shane 
Luck. 
2. On November 28, 1989, Petitioner prepared an 
earnest money sales agreement, whereby Gidalthi 0. Ojeda D 
BU000138 
offered to purchase a Provo, Utah home owned by a Robert and 
Alice Skankey. Petitioner received $500.00 earnest money, 
which he deposited to the Help-U-Sell real estate trust 
account. The Skankeys accepted the offer. Help-U-Sell was 
to be paid a fee totalling $2,450 on the sale of the home. 
Petitioner's commission, payable from that amount, would total 
$1,110.00. 
3. Help-U-Sell had full control of the $500.00 
earnest money deposited in its trust account and ultimately 
delivered the same back to the Skankeys. The Petitioner 
tendered the balance of Help-U-Sell's commission to Help-U-
Sell, which tender was refused. 
4. Petitioner's affiliation with Help-U-Sell was 
terminated on January 18, 1990. The Ojeda-Skankey transaction 
was not closed as of that date. 
5. Prior to terminating Petitioner's affiliation 
with the Help-U-Sell brokerage, Mr. Luck inquired if 
Petitioner had any transactions which were still pending. At 
that time the Skankey-Ojeda transaction appeared as though it 
would not close. This information was given to Mr. Luck. 
6. Petitioner's license was inactivated January 
18, 1990 and remained in that status for approximately three 
(3) weeks. The license was then suspended for one (1) year, 
effective February 10, 1990, pursuant to an order entered by 
the Commission (Case No. E89-06-10). 
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7. On January 20, 1990 the Skankeys executed a 
warranty deed, whereby they conveyed the property to the 
Ojedas. On January 22, 1990 an all-inclusive trust deed was 
executed by the Ojedas and notarized by the Petitioner. The 
Administrative Law Judge found that the closing occurred on 
January 22, 1990, some four days after the Petitionees 
license was inactivated. 
8. On or about February 16, 1990, Petitioner 
tendered an $840.00 check to Help-U-Sell. The February 16, 
1990 check represented the selling fee which would have been 
retained by the brokerage less the earnest money still on 
deposit. By letter, dated February 22, 1990, Mr. Luck 
returned the closing documents to Petitioner, advised 
Petitioner that the Skankeys had been informed Petitioner 
would have the closing documents and informed Petitioner that 
the Skankeys wanted "their closing documents and money 
immediately" and a "settlement on the January rent prorations 
with Ojeda." 
9. Help-U-Sell was unwilling to close this 
transaction. The Skankeys (sellers) and the Ojedas (buyers) 
were extremely anxious to cause the sale to go forward. In 
the absence of the sale the Skankeys believed they would be 
significantly damaged. Indeed, Dr. Skankey testified in his 
deposition conducted on Friday, June 4, 1993 at page 31, lines 
12 through 16: 
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Q: So, Dr. Skankey, our question is, is that 
if you assume for a minute that the Ojeda 
sale didn't take place, and no one 
followed through on it, would that have 
been harmful to you? 
A: Yes. 
10. The Respondent disbursed all funds due the 
Skankeys (sellers) on February 16, 1990. Mr. Luck 
subsequently sent the earnest money deposit to the Skankeys. 
11. Neither the Skankeys nor the Ojedas suffered 
any damaged by reason of the Petitioner's action in closing 
this transaction. 
12. The Petitioner was motivated to close this sale 
as a result of his desire to assist both the Ojedas and the 
Skankeys in their desire to complete this transaction. 
13. In light of the determination by the 
Administrative Law Judge (J. Steven Eklund) that the closing 
occurred on January 22, 1990, four (4) days after the 
Petitioner's associate broker's license was inactivated, the 
Petitioner could have re-activated his own principal broker's 
license, prior to the closing date, and completed this 
transaction. The transaction would have been no different had 
this license been reactivated, but rather, would have been 
consummated in the identical manner it was in fact 
consummated. 
14. The only person or entity claiming any damage 
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in this matter is a claim by Mr. Luck on behalf of Help-U-
Sell for lost business. The broker's portion of the 
commission was either controlled by Help-U-Sell (in the form 
of the $500.00 Help-U-Sell earnest money deposit) or tendered 
to Help-U-Sell (in the form of a check in the amount of 
$840.00 delivered by Petitioner to Help-U-Sell)• 
15. The recommended order as prepared by the 
Administrative Law Judge was that the Petitioner's license as 
a real estate broker be revoked. The Utah Real Estate 
Commission confirmed and adopted the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order as prepared by the 
Administrative Law Judge. 
16. Revocation of the Petitioner's real estate 
license is a severe disciplinary sanction. Petitioner 
respectfully requests that the sanction be reviewed and a 
hearing be held on the same, particularly in light of: 
a. Mr. Ostler's admission in his initial 
response addressed to the Department of Commerce, 
Blaine E. Twitchell, Director, wherein the 
Petitioner admits that the transaction should have 
been finalized through the brokerage; 
b. Mr. Ostler's motivation to close this sale 
to avoid harm to the Skankeys as set forth in Dr. 
Skankey's deposition; and 
c* There have been no complaints received by 
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the Department of Commerce, Division of Real Estate, 
against this Petitioner for actions taken by this 
Petitioner since the date of the transaction which 
is the subject matter of the petition filed herein. 
In that interim# the Petitioner has worked in the 
real estate industry. 
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner requests that the Order 
of July 6, 1994 be reviewed and, upon review, that the 
sanctions imposed therein be amended to a three (3) month 
suspension and a fine of not more than $1,000.00. To the 
extent it is within the Executive Director's authority, it may 
be appropriate to, rather than amending the entire sanction, 
suspend the sanction for the purpose of putting the Petitioner 
on a probationary status for one year or such other time 
period as to the Commission may seem appropriate. It is 
further requested that the sanction not be invoked until such 
time as this matter may be heard on the merits. 
/** /I 
DATED this / day of August. 1994. 
T. MORRIS OSTLER 
Petitioner 
SEILER & GLAZIER 
^ ' — — JA 
THOMAS W. SEILER^^ 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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